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We consider the supply of a public good based on a publicly-owned facility. The 
Government has a choice between provision in-house and privatizing the facility and then 
outsourcing the production. In particular, we focus on corruption in the decision to privatize 
and on its effect on social welfare when there is asymmetric information on the public and 
private manager's efficiency. Our analysis shows that a corrupt Government, that chooses to 
privatize only in exchange for a bribe, makes a positive selection on the private firm's 
efficiency and, thus, may raise expected social welfare above what an honest Government 
could get.  
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Corruption is usually deﬁned as the use of public oﬃce for private gains by
bureaucrats or politicians. Economists have always been interested in the
eﬀects of corruption on welfare and the literature on this subject is by now
a large chapter of public economics, as reviewed in Bardhan (1997), Jain
(2001) and Aidt (2003). A strand of this literature maintains that some
corruption might be desirable, by helping individuals and ﬁrms to reduce
delay in administrative procedures and eﬃciently solving queuing problems
(see, for example, Lui 1985). The majority of the authors, however, view
corruption less positively.
A special case for the study of corruption is the process of privatization.
Privatization is often seen as a way to reduce the opportunities for corruption
and to enhance eﬃciency. The process of privatization itself, however, is an
occasion for public bureaucrats to collect bribes: ﬁrms may pay oﬀ oﬃcials
in order to inﬂuence the decision whether to sell state-owned enterprises,
at what price and to whom. Looking at the experiences of privatization
in the East European countries and in Latin America in the last twenty
years, one comes to the conclusion that bribery seems to be a common
occurrence (Celerier, 1996; Kaufmann and Siegelbaum, 1997; Chong and
Lopez de Silanes, 2004). But should we be concerned? Does corruption
forfeit most of the advantages that privatization was intended for, as most
think, or is it possible that corruption plays the role of an eﬃcient allocation
mechanism? This is the question that we address in this paper.
The issue has been raised before in the literature, although not in a
formal model and the conclusions are not univocal. On the one hand,
along with the tradition that corruption might be desirable, some think
that bribery can reproduce the eﬃciency consequences of a competitive bid-
ding procedure: the most eﬃcient producer has the largest surplus, therefore
he can aﬀord the largest bribe. However, even the proponents of such view
recognize that the Coasian bargaining between the bureaucrat and the pri-
vate ﬁrms might fall short of achieving eﬃciency when we bring in issues of
asymmetric information, uncertainty (given the risk of being caught) and
contract enforceability (Bardhan, 1997). On the other hand, and this seems
to be the prevailing view, most authors think that corruption is the source
of large ineﬃciencies in the process of privatization and that the necessity to
pay a bribe plays the role of a barrier to entry (for example, Rose-Ackerman,
11997 and 1999).
The goal of this paper is to provide a formal model of the eﬀects of cor-
ruption in the decision to privatize and to investigate the selection properties
of bribing in the presence of asymmetric information on the ﬁrms’ eﬃciency.
Our analysis shows that a corrupt Government, that chooses to privatize
only in exchange for a bribe, may raise expected social welfare above what
an honest Government could get. This result is achieved because the bribe
asked by the public oﬃcial plays the role of a positive selection device.
Therefore, the result holds despite the asymmetry of information; in fact, it
holds because of it.
We consider a Government that wants to supply a public good and has a
choice between provision in-house and outsourcing. The latter is conditional
on privatizing a facility necessary for the production of the good; think, for
example, to school education where the facility is the school building. Our
starting point is a model, along the lines of Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997),
analyzing the trade-oﬀ between public and private provision (in terms of cost
and quality of the good) in which we introduce corruption in the privatiza-
tion process: a corrupt politician chooses to privatize only when the private
ﬁrm agrees to pay a bribe asked on the basis of a take it or leave it oﬀer.
The public oﬃcial, not knowing the eﬃciency of the private ﬁrm, asks for
an “average” bribe which turns out to be too high for low eﬃciency ﬁrms.
Consequently, he privatizes only when the eﬃciency of the ﬁrm is above
average and in this way he raises the ex-post average eﬃciency of the pri-
vatized ﬁrm above the ex-ante average. An honest but equally uninformed
public oﬃcial, on the other hand, chooses to privatize only on the basis of
the private ﬁrm’s ex-ante expected eﬃciency, without making any selection.
This diﬀerence between the two regimes may be strong enough to make
corruption beneﬁcial.
There are few other contributions that analyze the consequences of cor-
ruption in the privatization process. In Bjorvatn and Soreide (2005), diﬀer-
ently from our model, the decision to privatize is given but the privatization
price and the market concentration after privatization are endogenous. The
main result of the paper is that social welfare is lower the higher the level
of corruption due to higher concentration. In their model the eﬃciency of
the ﬁrm is not an issue. In Laﬀont and Meleu (1999), instead, the choice to
privatize is endogenous and it occurs when politicians can recoup the lost
2gains they derived from the public ﬁrm with shares of the private one; this
leads to a u-shaped relationship between the level of corruption and priva-
tization. In this paper the driving force is not corruption in the decision to
privatize but corruption, and the associated gains, before it.
Perhaps more similar in spirit to our paper are Beck and Maher (1986)
and Lien (1986 and 1990). These papers look at the relationship between
corruption and procurement; in particular, they study a bribery game where
ﬁrms compete to win a Government contract and there is asymmetric infor-
mation on the private ﬁrms’ cost of providing the good. Instead of assum-
ing that the public oﬃcial makes a take-it-or-leave-it request for a bribe, as
we do, they consider the case of multiple ﬁrms bidding competitively their
bribes. They show that there is an isomorphism between bribery and a com-
petitive bidding procedure such that both mechanisms lead to the ex-post
eﬃcient allocation. Of course, this is true as long as the public oﬃcial is
only inﬂuenced by the size of the bribe. And problems may arise if bribes
are forfeited so that even the losers of the bribing game pay the cost of their
bribe, as pointed out by Clark and Riis (2000).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a
model of the trade-oﬀ between public and private provision without corrup-
tion and compares these two alternative regimes in terms of social welfare.
Section 3 introduces corruption and compares a situation in which the own-
ership structure is decided by a corrupt politician with that decided by an
honest one. This comparison yields the result that social welfare may be
higher with corruption. Section 4 discusses the generality of the result.
Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Provision without corruption
We consider the choice by the Government to supply goods such as hospi-
tals, school or prison services either in-house, i. e. through public employees,
or to contract them out to a private supplier. In this section we shall present
a simple benchmark model of the trade-oﬀs between public and private pro-
vision without corruption, that is with a benevolent politician whose payoﬀ
is equal to social welfare. Our model is a special case of Hart, Shleifer and
Vishny (1997)1 to which we refer for detailed proofs and motivation.
1 In particular, we consider the case b(e) = δe, c(e) = σ
√
e, β = 0, λ = 1.
3The Government owns a facility (for example a school) that is necessary
to provide a good. The diﬀerence between public and private provision
hinges on the residual control rights of this facility under the hypothesis
that contracts are incomplete. As argued in Shleifer (1998), this diﬀerence
would disappear if complete contracts could be written.
2.1 Private provision without corruption
If private provision is chosen, the facility needs to be privatized. The Gov-
ernment and a risk neutral private manager can write a long-term contract
specifying the prices PF of the facility and P0 of the public good. This basic
version of the good brings social beneﬁt B0 at cost C0, the latter to be borne
by the private manager. For convenience let P0 − PF − C0 = 0.
After the contract is signed, the manager chooses eﬀort e; this eﬀort
lowers production costs by σ
√
e, where σ ∈ [0,1] is a measure of the man-
ager’s cost reduction ability, but also decreases welfare by δe, δ ∈ [0,1], due
to lower quality. Therefore, e modiﬁes the basic version of the good in the
direction of lower cost but also lower quality.
We assume that exerting eﬀort costs the manager e. Social welfare as a
function of the manager’s ability σ and his eﬀort e is
W = B0 − C0 + σ
√
e − δe − e.
Eﬀort, costs and beneﬁts are not veriﬁable so they cannot be speciﬁed
ex-ante in the long-term contract. Since privatization gives the manager
residual controls, the manager can implement any cost reduction he wishes,
without Government’s approval. It follows that equilibrium eﬀort under pri-











and equilibrium welfare under private provision as a function of σ2 is




42.2 Public provision without corruption
Consider now public provision. We assume that the description of the good
is part of a contract between the Government and a risk neutral public
employee and we now interpret P0 as the wage the latter receives for pro-
viding (the basic version of) the good. Due to non veriﬁability, e cannot be
speciﬁed by this contract.
When provision is done in-house, the public employee cannot implement
cost reductions without Government approval because he does not have
residual control rights on the facility; also, the cost reducing eﬀort is em-
bodied in the public employee’s human capital, i.e. the Government cannot
achieve cost reductions without the employee’s participation. Therefore the
Government and the employee get engaged in a renegotiation of their initial
contract.
We assume that the gains achievable through renegotiation are split ac-
cording to the Nash bargaining solution. Since in the absence of an agree-
ment the basic good is produced, the employee’s payoﬀ after renegotiation
is given by





e − δe) − e;
this is the payoﬀ the employee maximizes when choosing the level of eﬀort.
Therefore, equilibrium eﬀort under public provision, denoted by eG, is
eG =
σ2
4(2 + δ)2 (2)
and equilibrium social welfare when the good is provided in-house is
WG(σ2) = B0 − C0 + σ2 δ + 3
4(2 + δ)2.
2.3 Evaluation of ownership structures without corruption
In order to evaluate the eﬃciency of the two forms of provision we ﬁnd the
eﬃcient cost reducing eﬀort, denoted by e∗, as the solution to the following
problem:
max
e B0 − C0 + σ
√
e − δe − e.
The unique solution is
e∗ =
σ2
4(δ + 1)2. (3)
5Comparing the ﬁrst best eﬀort e∗ with the two equilibrium eﬀorts eP of
Equation (1) and eG of Equation (2), we see that eG < e∗ < eP; thus, neither
form of provision is ﬁrst-best eﬃcient. More precisely, on one hand e∗ <
eP because private provision gives too strong incentives to introduce cost
reducing innovations. A private manager does not care about the negative
externality that his eﬀort has on social welfare; thus, his cost reducing eﬀort
is greater than the socially optimal one. On the other hand, eG < e∗, i.e.
the cost reducing eﬀort under public provision is smaller than the ﬁrst best
eﬀort, because a public manager gains only half of the beneﬁts associated to
his eﬀort but he bears the whole cost; therefore, he has too little incentives
to introduce cost reducing innovations.
Which form of provision is second-best eﬃcient depends on the value of
the parameters σ and δ, i.e. on the relative eﬃciency in cost reduction of
the private manager with respect to the public employee and on the social
costs of the cost reducing eﬀort.
In particular, when the two managers have the same σ, the equation
WP(σ) = WG(σ) determines a threshold value ¯ δ =
√
2 − 1 ' 0.4142 such
that private provision is better than public for δ < ¯ δ and, conversely, public
provision is preferable otherwise. In other words, when the two managers
have the same cost reducing eﬃciency, private provision is preferable if the
social cost of eﬀort, which is disregarded by a private manager, is not too
large.
When, instead, the private and the public manager have diﬀerent ef-
ﬁciencies in cost reductions, denoted respectively by σP and σG, private






(1 − δ)(2 + δ)2
(δ + 3)
.
Since the expression on the right is decreasing in δ, as δ increases the
private manager needs higher and higher eﬃciency, compared to the pub-
lic employee, in order to compensate the negative externality of the cost
reduction.
3 Provision with corruption
We now introduce corruption. We assume that the choice whether to priva-
tize the asset is taken by a corrupt politician who asks the private manager
6a bribe on the basis of a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. If the manager refuses the
oﬀer, the good is provided by a public manager; if, instead, the bribe is paid,
the facility is sold for a price PF and provision is contracted out.
The politician has incomplete information on both the private manager’s
and the public bureaucrat’s cost reducing eﬃciency, that is on the pair
(σP,σG), where σP and σG are two independent random variables whose
squared value σ2
P and σ2
G are both uniformly distributed in [0,1].
Let B be the bribe asked by the politician. An optimal choice of the




e − e ≥ B
and refuse to pay otherwise. By substituting the equilibrium level of eﬀort
eP of Equation (1) in the proﬁt expression above, we get that only a private
manager whose σ2
P is greater than 4B pays the bribe.
By subgame perfection, the politician asks for a bribe B∗ = 1
8, where







We conclude that when the choice to privatize is made by a corrupt




In order to evaluate the consequences of corruption on social welfare
we compute the ex-ante expected social welfare with corruption, that we
denote by WC. When σ2
P < 1
2 the private manager refuses to pay the bribe
and provision is public; therefore, with probability one half social welfare is
the expected value with respect to σG of WG(σG). When, instead, σ2
P ≥ 1
2,
the bribe is paid and the facility is privatized so that social welfare is equal
to the expected value of WP(σP) conditional on σ2
P ≥ 1



































We are now ready to compare expected welfare under the diﬀerent regimes.
3.1 Private provision versus corruption
In what follows we compare the expected social welfare in an economy where
provision of the public good is always privatized with that of an economy
where the decision whether to privatize is taken by a corrupt politician.





and consider the diﬀerence WC − WP which can be expressed as:







Notice that for σ2
P ≥ 1
2 a corrupt politician succeeds to extort a bribe and
provision is private. Therefore, the two regimes only diﬀer for σ2
P < 1
2.
As stated in Proposition 1, it turns out that corruption always leads to
higher expected social surplus than private provision.
Proposition 1 For any value of δ, WC ≥ WP.
Proof: Deﬁne ˆ σ2 such that WP(ˆ σ2) ≡ WG. Then:
ˆ σ2 =
δ + 3
2(1 − δ)(2 + δ)2.
Therefore ˆ σ2 is an increasing function of δ and it takes value 3
8 for δ = 0.
We consider two cases.
First case: δ < ¯ δ.
In this case WP(0) = 0 < WG < WP = WP(1
2). Since WP(σ2) is
continuous and strictly increasing in σ2, it follows that ˆ σ2 < 1
2.
Write the diﬀerence WC − WP as the sum of two elements:












8Notice that the ﬁrst integral is positive and the second is negative;
therefore, in order for WC − WP to be positive, we need the ﬁrst
element to be larger (in absolute value) than the second. Since WP(σ2
P)
is a linear function of σ2
P, this occurs for ˆ σ2 > 1
4. But this follows easily,
because ˆ σ2 is a increasing function of δ and ˆ σ2(0) = 3
8.
Second case: δ > ¯ δ.
We now have WP ≤ WG and, as before, WP(σ2) is continuous and
increasing. Thus WP(σ2) < WG for any σ2 < 1
2. It follows that:




[WG − WP(σ2)]dσ2 > 0.
2
According to Proposition 1, expected social welfare is larger when a self-
interested corrupt politician decides whether to privatize or not than under
privatization; this is true regardless of the value of δ, a measure of the social
cost of eﬀort.
Figure 1, which is drawn for δ = 0,2 illustrates Proposition 1. The
picture shows the areas corresponding to expected social welfare for the two
regimes: the grey shaded area represents corruption while the striped area
corresponds to privatization; as we already know, the two completely overlap








Figure 1: Expected social welfare under corruption and privatization.
2 The origin of the axis is (0,B0 − C0). Notice that the picture would be qualitatively
similar for any value of δ < ¯ δ, whereas for δ > ¯ δ we have WP(
1
2) < W G.
9To get an intuition of why the result holds notice that when the eﬃciency
σ of the private manager is low, two things happen: ﬁrst, privatization leads
to low social welfare and, second, a corrupt politician asks for a bribe too
high for a low eﬃciency manager to pay. Therefore, corruption produces a
positive selection eﬀect that leads to privatize only when the eﬃciency of
the private manager is higher than the average public bureaucrat’s. This
positive selection eﬀect is what makes corruption preferable to privatization
from the point of view of social welfare.
3.2 Public provision versus corruption
We now turn to the comparison of provision under corruption versus public
provision. Write the diﬀerence WC − WG as






Notice that now the two regimes lead to the same expected social welfare for
σ2 < 1
2 because in this range the private manager refuses to pay the bribe
and provision is public. Therefore the two regimes only diﬀer in the interval
1
2 ≤ σ2 ≤ 1.
As stated in the next proposition, the ranking of the two regimes now is
not independent on the value of δ, the social cost of the cost reducing eﬀort.
Proposition 2 There exists a δ ∈ (¯ δ,1) such that, for any δ < δ we have
WC > WG and for any δ > δ we have WC < WG.
Proof: We consider two cases.
First case: δ < ¯ δ.
In this case WG(σ2) < WP(σ2) for any σ2. Therefore WG < WP <
WC, where the last inequality follows from Proposition 1.
Second case: δ ≥ ¯ δ.
Deﬁne ˆ σ2 as in the proof of Proposition 1. We know that ˆ σ2 is in-
creasing in δ and ˆ σ2 = 1
2 when δ = ¯ δ.
If ˆ σ2 ≤ 1 we write the diﬀerence WC−WG as the sum of two elements:








10Notice that the ﬁrst integral is negative and the second is positive and,
by linearity of WP(σ2), the two integrals are equal when ˆ σ2 = 3
4.
If, instead, ˆ σ2 > 1 then WP(σ2) < WG for any value of σ2 ∈ [0,1] and




[WP(σ2) − WG]dσ2 < 0.
We conclude that WC −WG is positive for 1
2 < ˆ σ < 3
4, zero for ˆ σ = 3
4
and negative for ˆ σ > 3




the value of δ = 0.6542. 2
The conclusion of Proposition 2 for δ < ¯ δ, i.e. when the social cost of
eﬀort is small, is straightforward: since in this case public provision is worse
than privatization, corruption is the overall preferred regime. For higher
values of δ, however, things are more complex: when the social cost of eﬀort
raises above ¯ δ, the positive selection eﬀect of corruption is increasingly oﬀset
by the fact that private provision is socially ineﬃcient and it is not clear
which force is stronger. As it turns out, for suﬃciently high values of δ, the
second eﬀect prevails and public provision becomes preferable to letting a
corrupt politician decide the provision regime.
3.3 Benevolent versus corrupt politician
Using the result of Proposition 1 and 2 we can draw a picture of the overall
comparison of expected welfare in the three regimes as a function of δ. In
Figure (2), the black straight line is WP and the grey one is WC; as stated
in Proposition (1), the ﬁrst always lies below the second. These two lines
intersects the curve WG in ¯ δ and ¯ δ respectively.
A benevolent politician not informed on the relative values of the public
versus the private manager’s cost reducing eﬃciency would choose the provi-
sion regime in order to maximize the expected social welfare. Therefore, he
would choose to privatize whenever WP > WG, or δ < ¯ δ, and to provide the
good through a public bureaucrat otherwise. Thus, equilibrium expected





WP = B0 − C0 +
(1−δ)
8 if δ < ¯ δ
WG = B0 − C0 + δ+3













Figure 2: Expected social welfare comparison as a function of δ.
In Figure 2, WB is represented as a dotted broken line equal to WP
for δ < ¯ δ and to WG otherwise. The picture shows that this broken line
lies below the grey line WC for δ < ¯ δ and leads us to the conclusion that
corruption may be good for society.
Corollary 3 For δ < δ expected social welfare is higher with a corrupt
politician than with a benevolent one.
4 A comment on the generality of the model
The model considered so far is very simple; its main advantage is to allow
for easy-to-compute, closed form solutions of the equilibrium expected so-
cial welfare functions under the diﬀerent regimes. However, our result that
corruption may play a positive selection eﬀect holds in much more general
contexts.
Consider a situation where there is a trade-oﬀ between public and private
provision: when the negative externality on quality of the cost reducing eﬀort
is small, that is, for low values of δ, private provision is more favorable;
otherwise public provision is better. When this is not the case, one of the
two regimes is deﬁnitely superior and the choice of the regime should not
be left to a politician that would expose it to the risk of being based on
corruption. In other words, we believe that the question “who scores better
between a corrupt politician and a benevolent one” is, in this context, of a
more practical interest when the politician has a role to play in evaluating
12the social costs and beneﬁts of the two regimes.
To prove that the private regime is always worse, in terms of social
welfare, than corruption, we used three key elements; in what follows we
discuss them and we explain why they should hold in general.
The ﬁrst element is the fact that the bribing system selects the most
eﬃcient private managers. This fact follows from the assumption that the
private manager’s proﬁt is increasing in σ, the cost reducing eﬃciency. This
assumption seems natural in most reasonable representations of this prob-
lem.
The second element is that the comparison between social welfare under
corruption and that obtainable with privatization is monotonic in δ, which
measures the magnitude of the social cost of eﬀort. In our model, this follows
from the fact that WG decreases with δ at a slower speed than WP(σ) does.
Notice that both WG and WP(σ) are decreasing in δ; this is so because un-
der both regimes the cost reducing eﬀort is positive and, therefore, all other
things being equal, the higher is δ the lower is social welfare. However, they
decrease at a diﬀerent speed: in fact, the cost reducing eﬀort is decreasing
in δ under public provision, thanks to the fact that the latter regime partly
internalizes the negative eﬀect of eﬀort on quality and, thus, on social wel-
fare. Under privatization, instead, eﬀort is independent on δ. Therefore the
public provision regime is better than the private one in internalizing the
social cost of eﬀort. This is likely to be a common characteristic of this
problem, holding outside of our special model.
The third and last element that plays a role in our proof is the fact that,
for δ = 0, the managers left out under corruption, in other words those who
do not pass the ﬁlter of the bribing system, produce, on average, a smaller
expected social welfare than the average public bureaucrat. It is hard to
tell whether this condition holds in general, since it depends on the relative
magnitude of WP(σ) and WG and on the probability distribution of σG and
σP, i.e. on the distribution of the cost reducing eﬃciency in the public and
private sector. So it is this third fact that will likely decide, in a more general
model, whether the result holds true.3
3 More precisely, given the monotonicity in δ, if for some δ
0 the expected value of the
social welfare under privatization conditional on the set of manager’s types not accept-
ing to pay the bribe is smaller than the overall expected value of social welfare under
public provision, then we expect social welfare to be higher under corruption than under
privatization, for any δ ≥ δ
0.
135 Conclusion
We have focused on corruption in the privatization process and on its eﬀect
on social welfare when there is asymmetric information on the public and
private manager’s eﬃciency. Our analysis shows that when privatization is
decided on the basis of a take it or leave it request of a bribe, corruption
may play a positive selection eﬀect on the eﬃciency of the private ﬁrm and,
thus, it can be beneﬁcial.
Our result is obviously not suﬃcient to say that corruption is good for
the privatization process. Any such conclusion would require further re-
search. For example, one should investigate the functioning of alternative
mechanisms to determine the bribe magnitude. And, as suggested by the
empirical literature (Kaufmann and Siegelbaum, 1997; Chong and Lopez de
Silanes, 2004), one should also take a closer look at the way the sale price is
determined in order to understand its connections to corruption. However,
our result is certainly enough to say that, when looking at the process of
privatization, the relationship between corruption and eﬃciency is yet an
unsettled issue.
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